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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES, A Partnership,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Case No. 15501

M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS,
INC., A Utah Corporation,
DefendantRespondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT AS TO COUNTS l AND 3 OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
A.
There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclude
that a Breach of Contract Had Occurred by the Closure of the
Service Station and Sufficient Reliable Evidence was Presented
to Allow the Jury to Determine Resulting Damages.
The lease involved in this lawsuit provided that rental
payments would be made based on the real estate itself and also
upon the number of gasoline gallons sold per month.

The lease

provided that the station would remain open for 24 hours a day.
It can thus be readily seen that if the station were not open at
all during a 24-hour day then no gasoline would be sold and

therefore no gallonage rental would have accumulated.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Respondent in its brief repeatedly states that Appellant
was unable to prove "the reasons behind the service station being closed at various times".

(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8),

This question of "why" is totally irrelevant to the determination in this case since there is nothing in the lease agreement
which justifies closing of the station for any reason.

The sti·

pulated judgment provided that the station could be closed if
gasoline allotments were not received.

Respondent has never

contended that the station was closed because of a gasoline
shortage--if it were contending such a defense, it was its obligation to prove it not Appellant's.
Thus, once the station was shown to be closed for any period of time the burden shifted to Respondent to prove that such
cause was permitted under the terms of the stipulated judgment.
The defendant never argued nor attempted to do this but rather
complained that Plaintiff was unable to prove the reasons for
closure on each and every occasion testified to by the numerous
witnesses.
Respondent states that "Plaintiff's witnesses testified
u

that on several unspecified occasions the station was closed ·
(Respondent's brief, p. 7).

To say the least this is a gross

understatement of the evidence presented by Plaintiff.

As out·

lined in Appellant's brief in chief (pp. 10-14 l numerous witnes·
ses testified that the station was "closed every Thursday morn·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing", that the "station was usually closed during the weekends",
that the station was hardly ever open during the night", and that
the station was closed "at least 50 per cent of the time when an
employee arrived for work."

In addition, random pictures were

introduced into evidence showing the condition of the service
station during various times throughout the year.

(Appellant's

brief, p. 11).
Thus, the evidence was clear that the service station was
closed periodically throughout the time period when the lease
required the station to remain open 24 hours a day.
breach of the lease agreement occurred.

An obvious

The reasons for these

closures are irrelevant and if they are relevant it becomes Defendant's obligation to justify them.
Once the fact that the lease had been violated was shown
the next question remained as to what damages resulted.

In this

case the amount of damages resulted from the failure of Respondent to sell gasoline during the periods in which the station
was closed.

Respondent in its brief refers to American Jurispru-

dence as an authority stating that the fact of damages cannot be
based upon speculation and that no recovery can be made in cases
in which it is uncertain whether the plaintiff suffered any damages.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 8-9).

is correct.

This statement of the law

And, if it could be reasonably inferred that !!£

gasoline whatsoever would have been sold during the numerous
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times the station was closed (as testified to by Plaintiff's
witnesses) then a verdict in favor of Defendant should proper~
have been directed.
However, since the evidence showed that the station was
constantly selling gasoline to various customers throughout
each 24-hour period the inference exists that at least some unknown number of gallons of gasoline were not sold because the
station was closed.

This requirement to show the amount of

damages has also been well stated by the American Jur i s.erudence
authority.

It states:
Courts have stated that only reasonable certainty is required in proving the fact and
cause of the injury, but that the amount of
damages--once their cause and fact have been
shown, need not be proved with the same degree of certainty. This would indicate that
courts are more lenient in allowing the jury
to speculate as to the amount of damages after their cause has been proved • • • •
Damages are not rendered uncertain because
they cannot be calculated with absolute exactness or because the consequences of the wrong
are not precisely definite in pecuniary amount. An element of uncertainty in the amount
of damages or the fact that they cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy or with absolute certainty or exactness is not a bar to
recovery. Nor is mere difficulty in the assessment of damages a sufficient reason for refusing them when the right to them has been established ••
One whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages
suffered by a plaintiff is not entitled to
complain that they cannot be measured with the
same exactness and precision as would other-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

wise be possible. And some cases have further held that when the tort feason or cont~act breaker has caused the uncertainty, he
will not be allowed to complain that the damages cannot be measured with exactness. 22
Arn.Jur.2d, Section 23, pp. 42-43.
(Emphasis
added).
This same authority goes on to state:
Under such circumstances, all that can be
required is that the evidence--with such
certainty as the nature of the particular
case may permit--lay a foundation which will
enable the trier of facts to make a fair and
reasonable estimate of the amount of damages.
The plaintiff will not be denied a substantial recovery if he has produced the best
evidence available and it is sufficient to
afford a reasonable basis for estimating his
loss. Id. at Section 25, p. 45.
(Emphasis
added).Since Plaintiff did not maintain a 24-hour log of Respondent's station the best evidence available to prove the damages
caused by the closure was first, the prior history of the station itself as shown in Exhibit 35 (to be discussed infra in
this brief) and second, the expert testimony of Delbert Taylor
as to what he believed that the station should have been able
to produce in terms of gallons per day based upon the geographical conditions, his previous studies of that particular station
and the number of cars which pass by it during the damage period.
Respondent in its brief repeatedly states that Mr. Taylor's
testimony "lacks credibility".

(Respondent's brief, pp. 12-13).

It should be noted, however, that the testimony was never stricken nor did the trial court hold Mr. Taylor to be incompetent to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testify as an expert witness.
Respondent's opinion that Mr. Taylor's testimony lacked
credence was an argument for the jury and not for this court.
It goes without saying that the fact finder is the exclusive
judge of the credibility of witnesses and evidence.

Page v.

Federal Security Insurance Company, 332 P.2d 666 (Utah 1958);
Shupe v. Menlove, 417 P.2d 246 (Utah 1966).
Mr. Taylor was sufficiently credible to allow submission

of his testimony to the jury.

Mr. Taylor owned several service

stations, attended B.Y.U., and majored in Business Administra·
tion, worked for three major oil companies for ten years (Tr.,
p. 445), and regularly predicted the market potential of numer·
ous service stations in his sales area.

(Tr • , pp. 4 4 9-4 5 0) .

He stated that he was normally accurate in his prediction of
sales to a degree of 97 per cent.

(Tr • , p • 4 5 0 ) •

He testified further that he had had personal experience
with the Delle Service Station in 1971 to 1973 when he made pro·
jections for his company as to the marketability of that area.
(Tr., p. 451).

He stated that in determining the sales volume

of a service station he looked at several factors including lo·
cation, traffic count, the number of automobiles or trucks t~t
go by the location every day, and the regularity of hours that
a station is open.

(Tr., pp. 452-462).

The witness also exa·

mined the competition in the area and the number of miles from
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i·

previous gas stations that a motorist would have to travel.
('l'r,

f

PP• 465-466)

0

Respondent argues that because Mr. Taylor made one mistake as to an example of traffic count that his entire testimony should be disgarded.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 11-12).

This "mistake" again went only to the matter of weight and credibility and not to whether the jury should be able to weigh
the testimony at all.

In any event, this "extremely important

error" as stated by Respondent (Respondent's brief, p. 12) was
not critical since Mr. Taylor's opinion that a station located
in that geographic area should have produced three times the
amount of gasoline sales as were actually reported was not based
(Tr., pp. 469-470).

solely on the "error".

The "error in question" concerns July 10 in which the witness stated that on that day the peak hour of traffic was between 11:00 at night and 12:00 midnight.

The correct figure

as stipulated by Plaintiff's counsel was 11:00 in the morning
to 12: 00 noon.

(Tr., A-3).

However, this error on this one day

did not taint Mr. Taylor's entire testimony as to his estimate
of yearly gas sales.

He stated, for example, that on another

day, June 26, that the peak time for automobile traffic was between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m.

(Tr., p. 459).

He acknowledged that

the traffic count varied from a day-to-day basis.
Mr. Taylor based his opinion on a number of factors includSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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...
ing the fact that the volume of traffic passing by the service
station increased from 1974 to 1976.

(Tr., p. 460).

He also

based his opinion on the hypothetical offered by Plaintiff's
counsel summarizing the testimony of other witnesses as to various periods of time when the station was closed and stated
that based upon those facts the station would probably lose
about 70 per cent of its car trade and all of its truck trade.
(Tr., pp. 469-470).

He based his opinion further on the number

of cars which went by the station according to a monthly break·
down as provided by the Utah Highway Department of Transporta(Tr., p. 502).

tion.

It was stipulated that these records had

been used properly and that they were the official records kept
by the State of Utah as to traffic control.

(Tr. A-3).

Respondent in its brief states, "The Court, as a matter of
law could not submit this testimony, flawed as it was by the
error in reading the traffic count upon which Mr. Taylor based
his computation and his admitted lack of knowledge of the other
factors which he testified were essential to an adequate evalua·
tion."

(Respondent's brief, p. 13).

This statement flies con·

trary to the well-established rule that the jury must weigh the
credibility of witnesses and also to the rule that upon motions
for directed verdict, the trial court is obliged to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the verdict is sought to be directed.

Anderson v. Gribble,
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513

p,2d 432 (Utah 1973).

Nor can it be said as a matter of law

that reasonable men could not conclude that Mr. Taylor's testimony was credible as to his damage estimates and therefore this
court cannot sustain the granting of a motion for directed verdiet.

Anderson v. Gribble, supra.
The Kratzers case cited by Respondent (Respondent's brief,

p. 14) is not contrary to the position advocated by Appellant.
In that case a bakery was wrongfully closed down for a period
of time and damages were sought for periods extending beyond the
closure.

This Court stated:
IIJt is not possible to say with any degree
of certainty how much damage was caused to it
other than the loss of the sale for that one
day. 504 P.2d 40 (1972).
(Emphasis added).

In this case, contrary to the assertions made by Respondent,
Appellant was only attempting to prove what damages occurred because of the day-to-day failure of the station to be operational
and such a calculation is not speculative when it is based upon
the station's full-service operation and the testimony of an expert witness.
In summary, there was ample evidence that the station in
Delle was closed at various periods of time and for various
lengths of time during the years now in dispute.

The lease for-

bade any closure for any reasons and the stipulated judgment allowed closure only for shortages of gasoline.

The fact that

Plaintiff was unable to prove exact number of days and hours
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which the station was closed was immaterial at that point since
the lease had, as a matter of law, been breached.

The amount

of damages suffered because of this breach could only be proved
by "the best evidence" available to Plaintiff and the defendant:
cannot now complain

that mathematical certainty was not sham,

B.
There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclud,
that a Breach of Contract Occurred by the Failure of Defendan~
to Complete the Lagoon System and Sufficient Reliable Evidence
Was Presented to Allow the Jury to Determine Resulting Damages,
Once again, the respondent has completely distorted the
language of the 1971 lease agreement and the stipulated judgment
of 1974.

Respondent argues that while it constructed the lagoor1

system it was not required to obtain the final approval from th<
State Department of Health because Plaintiff's restaurant had
not been built and therefore the system could not be made opera·
tional until that time.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 15-21).

This argument completely ignores the clear language in the
stipulated judgment which states:

"The lagoon system shall be

designed and constructed to comply with the minimum requirements
of the State of Utah and the County of Tooele."

(Ex.

P-7).

Thi

language does not in any way mention the word "operation" and

Respondent's argument that the lagoon could not be fully "opera·
tional" is therefore completely without merit.

(Respondent's

brief, pp. 16-17).

The question was not whether the lagoon could properly opeI

ate but whether it had been properly built so that at the appro·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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priate time it could operate.

The evidence clearly showed that

the facilities did not meet health specifications because of design and construction defects and not because the facility was
not operating at the time.
A letter dated August 14, 1974 from the Division of Health
to the defendant clearly shows the construction and design defects:
The inspection has indicated that the treatment works, as constructed, deviate from the
approved plans and that the existing facility
does not comply with the Utah Code of Waste
Disposal Regulations. Therefore, you are
hereby requested to cease the discharge of
waste water to this treatment works until the
following corrections are made • • • •
1.

The pump station must be equipped with
dual grinder pumps, fan and vent.

2.

The section of force main at the ravine crossing must be adequately covered or insulated to prevent freezing.

3.

The inlet structure to the primary cell,
the transfer structure between the primary and secondary cell, and the emergency overflow structure must be built
to conform with approved plans.

4.

The lagoon system must be entirely enclosed by a six-foot high chain-link
fence. Also, appropriate warning signs
should be provided along this fence to
designate the nature of the facility
and advise against trespassing.

5.

The plastic liner in the lagoon cells
must be covered by two inches fines as
indicated on the plans.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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6.

The outer slopes of the lagoon dikes
must not be steeper than two horizontal to one vertical in order to maintain dike stability and guard against
erosion problems.
(D-38).

None of these deficiencies resulted because of the lagoon's
failure to operate at full capacity.

In fact, had the res-

taurant been present and discharging the required amount of
water the State Health Department still would not have passed
the lagoon because of these deficiencies.
For Respondent to state that it has "substantially complied.
with the agreement to build the lagoon is also a gross misstate·
ment.

The plaintiff testified that it would cost him between

$10,000 to $15,000 to complete the lagoon system according to
State Code.

(Tr., pp. 152-153).

Mr. Art Maxwell, a civil en-

gineer, submitted a June, 1977 estimate that it would cost $9,3

1
:

to "complete construction to meet requirements of State Divisio~
of Health".

(P-51).

The plaintiff was not required to gamble that upon comple·
tion of his $60,000 or $70,000 restaurant that Defendant would
complete the construction of the lagoon in time to make the res·
taurant operational.

While a seller, under an earnest money

agreement, is not required to deliver a clear title until the
final payment in a contract has been made, the language containe

in the lease agreement and stipulated judgment unmistakably pro·
vided that the defendant would "complete the same within one

-12-
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year from March 8, 1974".

(Ex.

P-7).

Thus Respondent's anal-

ogy to real estate transactions is not appropriate.

(Respondent's

brief , p • 19 ) •
Finally, Respondent's statement, "Until there is a restaurant to use the lagoon system, the lack of final approval of the
system is of no consequence to Plaintiff" (Respondent's brief,
pp. 21-22) is another example of Respondent's reckless disregard for Plaintiff's rights.

Such a statement is equivalent to

arguing that a home buyer should purchase a lot and build a home
with the hope that a sewer and water line will one day be hooked
to the lot to make the home inhabitable.

And, the argument would

then go, if such a line was not made it would then be the obligation of the homeowner to spend money (if he had it) to put in
his own sewer and water system.

Obviously, the lack of existing

sewer and water lines would be of "great consequence" to the
mythical homeowner both as to his decision to build the home
and as to his ability to obtain financing.
Respondent's arguments concerning the breach of the lease
agreement pertaining to the lagoon system cannot be sustained.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EXHIBIT
35 FROM ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE WHEN IT WAS
CLEARLY RELEVANT IN DETERMINING PLAINTIFF'S
DAMAGES.
Respondent asserts that "Plaintiff cannot have his cake
and eat it too".

(Respondent's brief, p. 23).

Respondent ar-
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gues that since the 1974 judgment included a provision requiring Defendant to maintain the station on a 24-hour basis that
it must be assumed that Exhibit 35 did not represent a full
24-hour a day annual operation and therefore was not competent
evidence.
This argument, however, is invalid.

First, Plaintiff ne-

ver alleged in the previous lawsuit that 1972 was the year in
which the 24-hour operating requirements had not been met.

The

complaint filed on October 3, 1972 in Civil 7761, Tooele County
did not allege a failure to maintain the station open on a 24hour basis.

Its provision did not appear until the 197 4 stipu·

lated judgment when Defendants had failed to maintain the station during 1973 on a full 24-hour basis.
For the very reason now argued by Respondents the figures
for 1973 were never attempted to be introduced into evidence
since they were not reliable as to full operational capacity
nor could they be used to prove damages after the 1974 stipula·
tion had been entered.

The court should note that Exhibits P-31

include gasoline summaries for 1976, that P-33 included summar·
ies for 1975 and that Exhibit 34 included summaries for 1974
and that Exhibit 35 was a proffered summary of 1972.

There w_!!

no exhibit offered by Plaintiff showing the gasoline sales in
1973.
If, as Respondent argues, 1972 was considered not to bea

-14-
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fully-operational year it seems highly unusual that the 1972
sales of

452,045 gallons of gasoline" would be used by both

parties as the basis to determine when the station was not receiving full gasoline because of shortages as provided in the
stipulated judgment, Exhibit P-7, pp. 5-6.

(See quotation in

Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10).
Finally, Plaintiff testified that 1972 was a 24-hour-aday year.

The following exchange took place between Plaintiff

and his counsel:
Q

I show you what's been marked for purposes of identification as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 35.

A

Yes.

Q

I

A

That was our gas sales in 1972.

Q

Now, in 1972 was the station operated
on a different basis as far as hours
are concerned and times than it was in
74? '75? '76?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

What was the difference?

A

They were operating mostly 24 hours a
day.
(Tr., p. 96).

will ask you if you can identify it.

Quite apart from the obvious fallacious argument of Respondent as to the irrelevancy of Exhibit 35, it should also be observed that this argument was never made at the lower court
but that it was always contended that the prior 1974 stipulated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment precluded any use of the 1972 figures.

(Tr . ' p . 13 5I,

The trial court specifically stated that the exhibit was deni·ec,
not because of its incompetency showing a 24-hour basis of aper:
tion, but because it predated the 1974 judgment and therefore
was barred.

(See Appellant's brief, pp. 27, 29).

Finally, Respondent concludes with the statement that "Ex·
hibit 35 lacks credibility for other reasons" and then proceeds
to list five such reasons.

(Respondent's brief, p. 24) .

Once

again, as noted in the previous section, Respondent makes a

j~

argument of credibility which is not a proper consideration of
this court.

Shupe v. Menlove, 417 P.2d 246 (Utah 1966).

T~n

cord will show that Appellant produced equally credible evidence
that conditions had actually improved in the area since 1972 anc
that more gas should have been sold.

(See e.g., Tr., pp. 96,

239).
It will serve no useful purpose to argue the merits of the
evidence to this Court and therefore the arguments of Respondent
concerning the alleged lack of credibility of Exhibit 35 need nc
further comment.
CONCLUSION
Respondent attempts to confuse the proof required as to the
fact of damages with the quantum of damages.

There was suffi·

cient evidence to show that the service station was closed dur·
ing long periods of time and that the c l osures were not "occasic:
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al" as Respondent views the evidence.

Since gasoline could ob-

viously not be sold during the time the station was closed some
damages were suffered during the days and nights the station remained closed.
The testimony of Mr. Taylor was competent to give the jury
a basis for determining what the damages should be.

This tes-

timony, in conjunction with the testimony of numerous witnesses
as to the time period and days the station was closed would have
given the jury a sufficient foundation as required by law to determine the amount of damages.

Had Exhibit 35, the prior his-

tory of the station itself during a full operating year, been
admitted into evidence the jury would have had the best evidence
obtainable for making a reasonable calculation as to damages.
Unfortunately, however, the trial court refused to admit
this valuable piece of evidence because of its predating of the
1974 judgment and now Respondent attempts to taint the offered
exhibit as not being indicative of a full operating period even
though the evidence in the record is to the contrary.
Finally, the trial court erred in not submitting the question of the lagoon construction to the jury since the lease agreement never required Plaintiff's restaurant to be built but did
require that the lagoon meet construction and design standards
of the applicable health codes.
For these reasons, a new trial should be ordered so that a
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jury can properly decide the numerous issues of fact and credi·
bility raised in this dispute.

Respectfully submitted,

Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

HENS COOK
3100 South
City, Utah

84109

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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